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McClain: Unreasonable Searches under the Fourth Amendment: The Rule Become

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: "THE RULE BECOMES
'CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER "'1
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its opinion in Katz v. United States.' The opinion reflected
an attempt by the Court to extract from the Constitution
the values of its drafters and apply those values to electronic
eavesdropping.' Concluding that the drafters would have intended to protect an individual from such surveilance techniques, the Court decided to free the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches from its dependency
upon notions of property and trespass. That decision has
been widely viewed as a landmark in the judicial development of the Constitution.4
Of necessity, the opinion in Katz overturned the old
standards by which alleged Fourth Amendment violations
were reviewed. To file the void, the opinion alluded to a new
approach that focused upon a notion of privacy.' Commentators, though favoring the abandonment of the old approach,
expressed concern over the vagueness of the new one.' They
feared that the lack of substance in the new approach would
make it difficult for lower courts to apply with any consistency.'
Now, 12 years later, the Court has been given sufficient
opportunity to clarify the rule announced in Katz. In fact,
four Supreme Court cases were decided under Katz during
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

99 S.Ct. 1391, 1402 (1979) (Rehnquist,
U.S.
Delaware v. Prouse, ......
J., dissenting).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Strict constructionalists were most annoyed by this approach. See Mr.
Justice Black's dissenting opinion, 389 U.S. at 364.
Note, Electronic Recording and Listening Devices, c LAND & WATER L. REv.
619 (1968); Note, Search and Seizure-Katz v. United States, a SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 337 (1968).
Katz v. United States, supra note 2, at 351.
Note, Electronic Eavesdropping under the Fourth Amendment-After
Berger and Katz, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 455, 470 (1968) ; Note, The Fourth
Amendment and Electronic Eavesdropping: Katz v. United States, 5 Hous.
L. REV. 990, 1011 (1968).
Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 68
SuP. CT. REV. 133, 137 and 152 (1968) ; Note, The Supreme Court 1967
Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 187-196 (1968).
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the 1978-79 term.' Unfortunately, the opinions in those cases
seem to espouse several different versions of the Katz standard. This comment will examine Katz and the opinions in
those four cases in order to determine the nature and scope
of the rule to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims.9
I.

KATZ

Katz v. United States dealt with the conviction of the
petitioner for violations of federal statutes making unlawful
the "transmitting [of] wagering information by telephone."' 0
At trial, evidence of certain telephone conversations had
been introduced; the evidence had been obtained "by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from
which [Katz] had placed his calls."'" The defendant appealed,
claiming the evidence was the product of an unconstitutional
search, and therefore inadmissible. After granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court was asked to determine 1) whether a
public phone booth was a constitutionally protected area;
and 2) whether physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area was necessary for a search to be unconstitutional.2
This phrasing of the issues had been dictated by
Olmstead v. United State3' 3 and its progeny."4 In Olmstead
the Court had stated:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many
federal decisions brought to our attention hold the
Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against
a defendant unless there has been an official search
and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

There were several other decisions involving the Fourth Amendment;
however, the four referred to here completely cover the various aspects
of 'the rule' and will be discussed at length later in this comment.
For other recent analysis of Katz, see Amersterdam, Perspectives of the
Fourth Amendment, 58 .MINN. L. REV. 348 (1974); Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 Mici. L. REV. 154 (1977).
Katz v. United States, supra note 2, at 348.
Id.
Id. at 349-350.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Note, supra note 7, at 188.
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physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the
purpose of making a seizure. 5
From this language, a sort of "trespass and tangibles only"
rule emerged. That is, the Constitution was henceforth
viewed as protecting individuals against trespassory searches
of material objects only."6
As a result, courts formulated a two step analysis of
alleged Fourth Amendment violations." First, an inquiry
was made into the nature of the thing searched, in order
to ascertain if it was within the scope of the constitutional
protection. Second, if constitutional protection existed, the
courts would determine whether the government's conduct
had been trespassory, or at least intrusive in nature. 8 If
intrusive or trespassory, the conclusion was reached that
the government's conduct amounted to a search under the
Fourth Amendment.
As recently as 1962, the Olmstead approach was reaffirmed by the Court in Lanza v. New York. 9 The principal
issues raised in that case were 1) whether a visitor's room
in a public jail was a constitutionally protected area; and
2) whether the planting of a surreptitious electronic eavesdropping device in a constitutionally protected area was an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment."0 The
Court first answered the second question in the affirmative.2 '
Then turning to the first question, the Court commented:
15.

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

Olmstead v. United States, supra note 13 at 466. The Olmstead approach
resulted from the Court's view that its proper role was to merely construe
the Constitution as the drafters had actually intended. Since electronic
eavesdropping had been unknown to the drafters, the Court concluded that
they could not possibly have intended to prohibit it. Thus, any decision
to limit the use of such surveillance techniques would have to be legislatively made.
Note, supra note 7, at 188.
Id. at 189-190.
In Silverman v. United States, 366 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court for the first
time held that evidence procured by electronic eavesdropping had been
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The basis for the result
was the fact that the electronic device used, a 'spike mike,' physically
penetrated into the defendant's house, a constitutionally protected area.
Further, the Court ruled that it was not necessary for a trespass under
local law to have occurred in order for an unconstitutional search to have
resulted; an invasion or an intrusion upon an individual's property may
be sufficient.
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
Id. at 142.
The Court cited Silverman, supra note 18, for its cursory response. 370
U.S. at 142.
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[T]o say that a public jail is the equivalent of a
man's 'house' or that it is a place where he can claim
constitutional immunity from search or seizure of
his person, his papers, or his effects, is at best a
novel argument. To be sure, the Court has been far
from niggardly in construing the physical scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. A business office is
a protected area, and so may be a store. A hotel
room, in the eyes of the Fourth Amendment, may
become a person's 'house,' and so, of course, may an
apartment. An automobile may not be unreasonably
searched. Neither may an occupied taxicab. Yet,
without attempting either to define or to predict
the ultimate scope of Fourth Amendment protection, it is obvious that a jail shares none of the
attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an
office, or a hotel room."
However, the Court ultimately disposed of the case on other
grounds.23
In Katz, the Court's opinion2" rejected the Olmstead
and Lanza approach, and declined to accept the formulation
of the issues presented by the parties in the case." The
opinion stated that "this effort to decide whether or not a
given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'constitutionally
protected' deflects attention from the problem presented
by the facts of this case. For the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."" Moreover, the Court concluded
that "the underpinnings of Olmstead [and its progeny]
have been so eroded . . . that the 'trespass' doctrine there
enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.""
Despite discarding that doctrine and, thereby, the
generally accepted approach to Fourth Amendment claims,
the Court's opinion failed to provide much guidance as to
22. Id. at 143.
23. Id. at 147.
24. The Court's opinion in Katz was written by Mr. Justice Stewart. who had
also authorized the Court's opinions in Silverman, supra note 18, and Lanza.
25. Katz v. United States. supra note 2, at 350.
26. Id. at 351. In a footnote following this statement the opinion acknowledged
that previously the Court had "occasionally described its conclusions in
terms of 'constitutionally protected areas;' [however, it had] never suggested that this concept [could] serve as a talismanic solution to every
Fourth Amendment problem." Id. n. 9.
27. Id. at 353.
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how similar claims would be handled in future cases."
What little guidance was afforded stemmed from the Court's
statement that the electronic tapping of Katz's phone conversation "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth," 9 and that as a
result, a search within the meaning of Fourth Amendment
had occurred."0 From this language it appeared the Court
was actually employing a two-pronged test: first, it was
determining whether the governmental activity violated the
privacy of an individual; secondly, it was questioning
whether the individual had been justifiably relying upon
that privacy."
Unfortunately, key terms such as 'privacy' and 'justifiably relied' were not defined in the opinion.2 The extent
of the Court's aid in explaining its ultimate intent was the
statement that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. .

.

. [However] what he

seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.""3
The opinion did proceed to spell out clearly that once the
determination had been reached that a search had been conducted, the search was, in the absence of a warrant, "per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."34 This, the
Court noted, was "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."3 For these, the Court
cited Carrollv. United States.." McDonald v. United States,"
Note, supra note 6, 5 Hous. L. REV. at 997.
Katz v. United States, supra note 2, at 353.
Id. at 354.
Kitch, supra note 7, at 139.
Note, supra note 7, at 191.
Katz v. United States, supra note 2, at 351.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). This case held that the
warrantless search of an automobile was constitutionally permissible, so
long as probable cause was present.
37. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). Here the Court recognized
that in an emergency police are allowed to conduct a warrantless search;
however, it found such exigent circumstances to be lacking in the facts
before it.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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5 Cooper v. California," and
Brinegar v. United States,"
Warden v. Hayden."

Thus, the Court's analysis in Katz of Fourth Amendment claims required at the outset a determination as to
whether a search had taken place. This presumably was
accomplished by ascertaining that the government had
violated the individual's privacy and that he had been justifiably relying on his privacy at the time. Once the conclusion was reached that a searcb had occurred, it was deemed
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless
either the search had been authorized by a warrant or one
of the 'well-delineated exceptions' was applicable.
The main problem under the Katz analysis was ascertaining when a search had occurred. In answer to this, the
Court seemed to do little more than throw about empty
phrases." As one commentator stated:
Although the rejection of such a particularized
formula as the trespass rule will be lauded by those
who favor a more functional approach to the fourth
amendment, there is little in the Court's opinion to
satisfy those who look for guidance concerning the
new standard now being employed in its stead. The
applicability of the fourth amendment to other
means of investigation hereto left unregulated because of the absence of the required physical invasion will remain unclear until the Court explains
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The Court reaffirmed the
automobile exemption established in Carroll v. United States, supra note 36.
39. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). In an unusual case, the Court
ruled that a car seized pursuant to a forfeiture statute could be searched
without a search warrant, because the search of the car "was closely
related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been
impounded, and the reason it was being retained." Id. at 61.
40. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In this case, the Court found that
police while in hot pursuit of a suspect may conduct warrantless searches
in order to locate him See McDonald v. United States, supra note 37.
Not noted by Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion were United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967). These cases provide two other exceptions to the per se unreasonable
rule. First, Rabinowitz as modified by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), permits police when making arrests to conduct warrantless searches
of the arrestee's person as well as the immediate area under the arrestee's
control. Camara, on the other hand, establishes a balancing test by which
the reasonableness of a search may be measured. Here, the need for the
search is weighed against the objectionable nature of the resulting invasion.
If the former outweighs the latter, then the search is reasonable; however,
a search warrant may still be required.
41. Kitch, supra note 7, at 152.
38.
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more fully what it means by "privacy"-apparently
now the key to this range of search and seizure
problems.42
An alternative approach was, in fact, outlined in Katz
by Mr. Justice Harlan in a concurrence, which has frequently been cited as establishing the standard by which
Fourth Amendment claims are measured-as will be seen
later in this comment.43 Perhaps disenchanted with the
majority opinion for its ambiguity,44 Mr. Justice Harlan
outlined what he considered to be the more appropriate
analysis." Under his approach, the concept of a 'constitutionally protected area' was retained. However, in order for
an area to be so designated, the individual asserting the
constitutional claim must have had a reasonable expectation
of privacy as to the area. This, in turn, meant "first that
[the] person [had] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation [was]
one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "4 If the conclusion was reached that an area was
constitutionally protected, then any physical or electronic
intrusion which violated the reasonable expectation of privacy constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment-and was "presumptively unreasonable in the
absence of a search warrant." 7 Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan
attempted to identify more clearly the considerations involved when resolving Fourth Amendment claims.
One problem with Harlan's opinion was his failure to
give any real guidance for determining whether society was
prepared to recognize an individual's subjective expectation
as reasonable. 8 This failure, much the same as the failure
of the majority to define 'justifiably relied,' was an open
42. Note, supra note 7, at 191.
43. Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86
YALE L. J. 1461, 1472 (1977).
44. In his article, Kitch concluded that the presence of Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion indicated that the Court had been intentionally vague
in drafting the new Fourth Amendment standard. This he believed was to
allow the Court room to retreat in the event it became necessary. Supra
note 7, at 138.
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 860-361.
46. Id.at 361.
47. Id.
48. Note, supra note 43, at 1473-1475.
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invitation to courts to act legislatively, or even arbitrarily,
in deciding what society would and would not recognize as
reasonable.49
II.

THE OCTOBER
U.

1978 TERM OF THE

S. SUPREME COURT

In its most recent term, the Supreme Court decided
four cases of particular note in light of Katz. Each of the
opinions discussed unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment. However, while all four opinions cited Katz as
controlling, each offered a different version of the standard
announced in that decision.
A.

Rakas

The first of the four decisions to be handed down was
Rakas v. Illinois." The case stemmed from the conviction of
Frank Rakas and Lonnie King for armed robbery. At their
trial, a gun obtained from a search of the car in which they
were passengers had been introduced into evidence, but the
defendants objected, asserting that the search was unconstitutional. Further, they claimed that automatic standing
to object to the search should be extended to them under
Jones v. United States,51 because they had been legitimately
on the premises at the time of the search. 2
The Court, in an opinion authorized by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, reexamined and rejected the notion of automatic
standing developed in Jones. It explained that "the type of
standing requirement discussed in Jones... is more properly
5 3
subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Therefore, the petitioners would not receive automatic
49. In determining whether a particular expectation is reasonable, courts are
generally free to balance the needs of law enforcement against what they
see as the value of the privacy interest in a particular case. This approach
may result in "a fourth amendment with all of the character and consistency of a Rorschach blot." Amersterdam, supra note 9, at 375.
, 99 S.Ct. 421 (Dec. 5, 1978). The Court
--------.----U.S
50. Rakas v. Illinois
was split 5-4, with White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissenting.
51. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
52. The Court in Jones provided that where possession or ownership of the
item seized constituted the crime with which the defendant was or will be
charged, or where the defendant was legitimately on the premises at the
time of the search, the defendant would have automatic standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search and/or seizure.
53. Rakas v. Illinois, supra note 50, at 428.
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standing to object to a search merely because they had been
legitimately on the premises. Instead they would have to
show that under Katz their own Fourth Amendment rights
had been violated by the search. 4
The Court's opinion then turned to the question of
whether the petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights had in
fact been violated. Citing Katz, the opinion pointed out "that
capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depend[ed] not upon a property right in the invaded place
but upon whether the person who claim[ed] the protection
of the Amendment [had had] a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place.""
At this point in the opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
noted his understanding of the term 'legitimate expectation
of privacy':
[It] by definition means more than a subjective
expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off
season may have a thoroughly justified subjective
expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the
law recognizes as "legitimate." His presence, in the
words of Jones . . . is "wrongful"; his expectation
is not "one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'" [Citing Harlan's opinion in Katz.]"0
Mr. Justice Rehnquist further commented that "one who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue
54. The dissent, in an opinion authored by Mr. Justice White, criticized the
majority for abandoning a thoroughly workable rule and in effect cutting
back on the Fourth Amendment protection afforded the populace, in order
to limit the application of the exclusionary rule. "If the Court is troubled
by the practicable impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue
of the rule's continued validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in
specific cases." Id. at 437.
55. Id. at 430.
56. Id. n. 12. This hypothetical is troubling. Apparently Rehnquist is concluding that the expectation is unreasonable because the presence is wrongful. But is the presence wrongful because the burglar is not legitimately
on the premises-the Jones standard which Rehnquist rejected, or because
the burglar's conduct is illegal-which would indicate that an individual
may lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment by performing an illegal
act. If the latter is what Rehnquist had in mind then the question as to
the permissibility of a search would depend upon the defendant's guilt.
Such an approach would not deter the police from conducting searches
that are within the constitutional prohibition, the stated objective of the
exclusionary rule. See Id. at 429, n. 9.
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of [his] right to exclude.""7 But, "[o]n the other hand, even
a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect
to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted thereon.""8
Under this analysis the opinion concluded that "petitioners' claims must fail.""' The reasons given in support
of this conclusion were: 1) that the petitioners "asserted
neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized,"6 " 2) that
their being "legitimately on the premises in the sense that
they were in the car with the permission of its owner [was]
not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile
searched,"'" and 3) that "they made no showing that they
had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they
were merely passengers."6
Reviewing the standard employed by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in the maojrity opinion, only the first half of the Katz
analysis (whether within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment there had been a search) was discussed. However, as
to it, the opinion in Rakas indicated that an unconstitutional
search resulted only when the individual claiming its occurrence had possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded area. Mr. Justice Rehnquist seemed to break
this requirement down into two components in a manner
similar to Mr. Justice Harlan's approach in Katz: 1) the
individual must have had an expectation of privacy, and 2)
Id. at 431 n. 12.
Id.
Id. at 433.
It should be noted that petitioners claimed they were never asked if the
seized rifle was theirs, and that under Jones, the controlling law up until
Rakas was decided, there was no reason for petitioners to assert such a
property interest. However, despite a request by petitioners for a remand
if the Court determined that an ownership interest in the rifle was an
adequate basis for standing to object to the search, the Court concluded
that the petitioners had failed to carry their burden on the issue and
rejected their request. ld. at 423 n. 1.
61. Id. at 433,
62. Id. Again up until Rakas was handed down, the petitioners had no reason
to believe that under Jones such a showing was necessary.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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society, or perhaps more correctly, the Court must have been
willing to recognize the expectation as legitimate."5
In order for the two part test to be satisfied, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist indicated that the presence of a property right in
the invaded area was usually necessary. But this did not
reflect a necessary link between the Fourth Amendment and
property rights. Instead, it reflected the fact that the property right to exclude others fostered the development of an
expectation of privacy. Thus, under Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
view, the presence of a legitimate expectation of privacy
was tied to the amount of dominion and/or control an individual exercised over the invaded area. "4
Perhaps some further guidane as to how the test should
be applied appeared in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's hypothetical
about the 'burglar in the summer cabin.' There, by connecting the wrongfulness of the burglar's presence with the
determination that the burglar's expectation was not legitimate, the opinion indicated that the morality or legality
of the claimant's conduct would directly affect the legitimacy
of his expectation of privacy. 5
In any event, Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion imposed
upon the claimants the burden of "showing that they had
[had a] legitimate expectation of privacy." 6 Thus, presumably each claimant had the difficult task of establishing to
the Court's satisfaction that they had in fact possessed an
expectation of privacy in the invaded area, as well as the
legitimacy of that expectation.7
63. Id. at 430 n. 12.
64. This view can be seen in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's explanation of the result
in Katz. There, "the defendant shut the door behind him to exclude all
others and paid the toll." Id. at 433.
65. Because of the split of the Court in this case, particular attention should
be paid to Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in order to determine
whether a majority of the Court would accept this propsition. See note
70 infra.
66. Fakas v. Illinois, supra note 50, at 433.
67. From the number and type of obstacles the opinion raises in opposition
to petitioners' Fourth Amendment claims, the conclusion inevitable follows
that the dissent is correct in its view that the majority is covertly attacking
the exclusionary rule, see supra note 54. In fact, Mr. Justice Rehnquist as
much as admits it when he states: "Conferring standing to raise vicarious
Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily mean a more widespread
invocation of the exclusionary . . . Each time the exclusionary rule is
applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth
Amendment rights. . . . [Mlisgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the
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In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell outlined
his approach to determining whether a search had occurred
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Under it,
"[t]he ultimate question [was] whether [the] claim to privacy from government intrusion [was] reasonable in light
of all the surrounding circumstances. ' ' 5
In making this determination, he pointed out several
factors that, though not necessarily determinative, were to
be considered. These were 1) the precautions taken by the
person invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment
in order to maintain his privacy;"D 2) the use to which the
individual had put the location in which his expectation of
privacy was vested;-" 3) the likely intent of the drafters of
the Constitution as to the type of governmental intrusion
involved;71 and 4) the property rights the individual had
in the invaded area. 2
Finally, Mr. Justice Powell's opinion avoided the use
of any language imposing a burden of proof on the petitioners in the case. He did not dispute whether they had had
an expectation of privacy. He simply concluded that any
privacy expectation of mere passengers in a car was not
reasonable.73

68.
69.

70.
71.
72.

73.

class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly considered when
deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations." Id. at 427.
Id. at 435.
For this, the opinion cited United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(the defendant had placed his personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker), and Katz, supra note 2 (the defendant, while using a public telephone booth, had shut the door and paid the toll). Id. at 435.
Here, the opinion cited Jones, supra note 51, noting that there the defendant obtained a privacy interest in an apartment in which he slept and in
which he kept clothing. Id. at 435.
The opinion referred to Chadwick, supra note 69, at 7-9, in support of this
statement, apparently because there personal effects were involved-the
protection of which the drafters gave high priority. Id. at 435.
Here the opinion noted Alderman v. United States, 384 U.S. 165 (1969),
where the Court had granted the defendant standing to object to the
recording of a telephone conversation to which he had not been a party,
but which had occurred on a telephone located in his house. Id. at 435.
The dissenting opinion is not discussed in the comment because it merely
stated that, even if automatic standing was rejected, the petitioners had
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy. There was no discussion
of why. Id. at 443 n. 21. (dissenting opinion)

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/9

12

McClain: Unreasonable Searches under the Fourth Amendment: The Rule Become

1980
B.

COMMENTS

287

Smith

The next case to be considered is Smith v. Maryland."
There, after being robbed, a woman "began receiving
threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying
himself as the robber."7' Once, the caller asked the woman
to step out on her porch; while on the porch, she saw a 1975
Monte Carlo, which she had also seen near the robbery,
moving slowly past her house. Later, police spotted a 1975
Monte Carlo in the woman's neighborhood, driven by a man
who fit the woman's description of the robber. "By tracing
the license plate number, police learned that the car was
registered in the name of petitioner, Michael Lee Smith. 70
At the request of police, the telephone company then
installed a pen register in order to record the numbers
dialed on petitioner's telephone. Shortly thereafter, the
device revealed that a call was made from petitioner's phone
to the woman. On the basis of this information, a warrant
was obtained in order to search petitioner's residence. This
search produced more evidence against petitioner, and lead
to his arrest for robbery.7"
At trial, the pen register tape which showed that a
phone call had been dialed from petitioner's phone to the
victim's phone was admitted into evidence over petitioner's
objection. Following a conviction, petitioner appealed, claiming that the pen register tape and certain other evidence
was the fruit of an unconstitutional search and therefore
inadmissible. After the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order
to resolve whether the Fourth Amendment imposes any restrictions upon the use of pen registers."
U.S ...... - 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979). The Court split
74. Smith v. Maryland -......
6-3 in its decision with Stewart, Marshall, and Brennan dissenting.
75. Id. at 2579.
76. Id.
77. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on
a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on
the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and
does not indicate whether calls are actually completed." United States v.
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161, n. 1 (1977).
In this case the pen register was installed at the phone company's central
, 9 9 S .C t. a t 2 578 .
office - ........U .S .
78. Id. at 2579.
79. Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 9

288

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, commented that "[i]n determining whether a particular form
of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" our lodestar
is Katz v. United States."'" Furthermore, under Katz, "this
Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its
protection can claim that a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a
'legitimate expectation of privacy' has been invaded by
government action.1112 Mr. Justice Blackmun then noted that
in making this inquiry the appropriate questions to be considered were those raised by Mr. Justice Harlan in his
concurrence in Katz: 1) whether the individual had exhibited
a subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) whether this
expectation was one society was prepared to recognize as
reasonable.83
In analyzing petitioner's claim under this standard,
Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion looked first to whether
"people in general entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial."8 4 Citing the fact that
pen registers are known to be routinely used by the telephone companies for recording the dialing of long-distance
telephone calls as well as for other business purposes, and
the fact that "[m]ost phone books tell subscribers ... that
the company 'can frequently help in identifying to the authorthe
ities the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls,' ,,8O
opinion concluded that people do not have this requisite
expectation of privacy. "Although subjective expectations
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe
that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general8 1expectation that the numbers they dial will
remain secret.1
80. The opinion noted that, though the pen register had been installed by the
phone company-a private party, the company had acted at police request.
In light of this, the State conceded that sufficient agency existed to render
the installation 'state action.' Id. at 2579 n. 4.
81. Id. at 2579-2580.
82. Id. at 2580.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2581.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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Nevertheless, petitioner argued that his conduct, in
using the telephone in his own home to the exclusion of
others, demonstrated an expectation of privacy. The opinion,
however, concluded that this "could make no conceivable
difference," since petitioner still had had to convey the same
information to the telephone company."8
Moreover, the opinion noted that "even if petitioner did
harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers
he dialed would remain private, this expectation [was] not
one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 'reasonTo support this point, the opinion pointed out "that
able.' ....
a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."9 Here,
"petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to
the telephone company; '"" and therefore, the expectation
would not have been legitimate.92
C.

Wolfish
The next case to be discussed is Bell v. Wolfish. 3 There,
an action had been filed challenging the conditions in the
Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), a federal facility
in New York City which primarily housed pretrial detainees.
After the lower courts ruled in favor of the challengers,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed."
Part of the challenge had been to the MCC requirement
that all inmates had "to expose their body cavities for visual
88. Id. at 2582. This should be compared to Alderman, supra note 72.
89. Smith v. Maryland, supra note 74, at 2582.
90. Id. This would seemingly correspond to the observation made by Mr. Justice
Powell, in his opinion in Rakas, that one of the Court's considerations in
Fourth Amendment cases is what precautions the claimant took to protect
his privacy. See supra note 69.
91. Smith v. Maryland, supra note 74, at 2582.
92. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart expressed his view that there should be
no distinction between dialed phone numbers and phone conversations for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Both require a certain amount of disclosure
to the phone company; yet, the majority's opinion only protects an individual from disclosure of the latter. Id. at 2583.
Mr. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, questioned the majority's conclusion
that individuals do not have an expectation of privacy as to the phone
numbers they dial. He further questioned how voluntarily the defendant had
turned over the phone number to the telephone company-what was his
alternative. Id. at 2584-2585.
U.S.
, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979). The Court split
93. Bell v. Wolfish, 5-4 on the aspect of the case discussed here with Justices Marshall, Powell,
Stevens and Brennan dissenting.
94. Id. at 1866.
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inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every
contact visit with a person from outside the institution."95
The challengers asserted that this practice violated the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, was
willing to assume "for present purposes that inmates, both
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some
Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility."9 Apparently included among those rights
was a reasonable expectation of privacy as to one's person,
since the opinion continued upon the presumption that a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment had
occurred. The opinion thereafter dealt only with the second
half of the Katz analysis, whether the search was in compliance with the Constitution.
Turning to this question, Mr. Justice Rehnquist commented that in order for a search to pass muster under the
Fourth Amendment it merely must have been reasonable."
He continued:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing
of the need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the search entails.
Courts must consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted,
the justification for initiating it and the place in
which it is conducted.98
95. Id. at 1884. Also challenged were: 1) the double-bunking of pretrial
detainees (this was claimed to deprive individuals of liberty without due
process); 2) a restriction on the books and magazines that an inmate
could receive from outside the institution (this was argued to contravene
the inmates First Amendment rights); 3) a rule against the receipt of
packages from the outside containing food or personal property (here it
was asserted that pretrial detainees were denied property without due
process); and 4) the conducting of unannounced searches, 'shakedowns,'
at irregular intervals which the inmates were not allowed to watch (here
the challenge was based on the Fourth Amendment).
96. Id.
97. For this proposition Carroll, supra note 36, was cited. Id. at 1884.
98. Id.
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Cited for this statement of the law were, among others,
Katz and Terry v. Ohio."9
In applying this test, Mr. Justice Rehnquist further
stated:
We do not underestimate the degree to which these
searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates. Nor do we doubt . . . that on occasion a
security guard may conduct the search in an abusive
fashion.... Such an abuse cannot be condoned. The
searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
• . . But we deal here with the question whether
visual body cavity inspections as contemplated by
the MCC rules can ever (emphasis in original) be
conducted on less than probable cause. Balancing
the significant and letitimate security interest of
the institution agjainst the privacy interest of the
inmafes,
we conclude that they can. [Emphais ad0
ded] 10
Thus, under Mr. Justice Rehnquist's test, Fourth Amendment rights were defeated by legitimate governmental
interests."'
Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion disagreed
with the use of the legitimate interest standard. In its
stead, he advocated the invocation of the compelling necessity standard, claiming that the due process clause required
99. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court in Terry held that
there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless
of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime.
Id. at 27. The Court excused this search from the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement by stating that
we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as a
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.
Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the
Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Id. at 20. For this the opinion turned to the balancing test outlined in
Camara, supra note 40, and concluded that this 'stop and frisk' type search
was reasonable under the Fourth. Id. at 20-27.
100. Bell v. Wolfish, supra note 93, at 1885.
101. Throughout the opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, after recognizing that the
inmates maintained various constitutional rights even. inside the correctional facility, concluded that the constitutional rights were subject to the
prison administrators' legitimate governmental interests.
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its application." 2 Further, he stated that under that standard
it was indisputable that the government could not justify
the searches.'
D.

Sanders

The final case to be considered is Arkansas v. Sanders.""
There, Lonnie Sanders had been tried for possession of
marihuana. Evidence introduced at the trial had been obtained as the result of a warrantless search of Sanders'
suitcase. At the time of the search, the suitcase was resting
in the trunk of taxi in which Sanders was a passenger." 5
The police had been acting on a tip that the suitcase contained marihuana when they stopped the taxi in order to
conduct the search. 08
Following his conviction, Sanders appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, contending that the evidence obtained
as a result of the search should have been inadmissible under
the exclusionary rule. The Court agreed and reversed. The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to clarify the
rule as "to warrantless searches of luggage seized from
automobiles."'0 7
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, did not
address whether a reasonable expectation of privacy had
existed. He merely assumed that the scope of the Fourth
Amendment's protection included the suitcase, since it was
the private property of Sanders.0 8
Almost all of the opinion was directed toward applying
the latter half of the Katz analysis, whether the search
102. Bell v. Wolfish, supra note 93, at 1894.
103. Mr. Justice Marshall also questioned the result under the standard in Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Id. Mr. Justice Powell dissented on the grounds
that in order to justify the body cavity searches there must exist "some
level cause, such as a reasonable suspicion." Id. at 1886. Mr. Justice
Stevens' dissent addressed other aspects of the decision. Id. at 1895.
99 S.Ct. 2586 (1979). The Court
U.S.
104. Arkansas v. Sanders, ......
split 7-2 in this case, with Blackmun and Rehnquist dissenting.
105. There was no problem with standing in this case, presumably because
Sanders was undeniably the owner of the suitcase. Moreover, as a passenger
in a taxi his expectation of privacy would conceivably be of greater
significance than the expectations of the petitioners in Rakas.
106. Arkansas v. Sanders, supra note 104, at 2588.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2590.
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comported with the Constitution. In outlining the Constitutional test, Mr. Justice Powell stated that "[i]n the ordinary
case.., a search of private property must [have been] both
reasonable and performed pursuant to a properly issued
search warrant."'' 9
The opinion then turned to the issue of whether the
warrant requirement could properly be disregarded under
the facts of the case. It was noted that previously the Court
had recognized various exceptions to the warrant requirement. "These [had] been established where it was concluded that the public interest required some flexibility in
the application of the general rule that a valid warrant is
a prerequisite for a search.""' In determining whether an
exception should be established, a balancing test was employed. In this test "the societal costs of obtaining a warrant,
such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruc"the reasons for
tion of evidence," were weighed against
111
prior recourse to a neutral magistrate.'
Mr. Justice Powell further pointed out that since disregarding the warrant requirement necessarily infringed
upon the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
had not been cavalier in recognizing exceptions. They were
always jealously drawn."' The burden was placed upon those
seeking the exceptions to demonstrate the need for them.
And, the reach of each exception was specifically limited
"to that which [was] necessary to accommodate the identified
needs of society..""..
Since Arkansas had argued that the search should be
proper under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the opinion discussed its applicability. Under the
exemption, cars could be searched without a warrant so
long as probable cause existed." 4 The reason for establishing
109. Id. By the use of the term 'reasonable,' Mr. Justice Powell apparently
means that there must have been some pre-existing justification for the
search. See id. at 2592.
110. Id. at 2590.
111. Id. at 2591.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Carroll, supra note 36.
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this exception had been twofold. First, "the inherent mobility
of automobiles often makes it impractical to obtain a warrant,""' thus something of an emergency situation existed
when dealing with a car. Secondly, the nature of the automobile often "dilute[d] the reasonable expectation of privacy
that exist[ed] with respect to differently situated property;""' therefore, it was less likely that a search within
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment was occurring.
Mr. Justice Powell's opinion in Sanders concluded that
neither of the rationales would be furthered by extending
the automobile exception to include luggage within the car;
therefore, the exception could not be so extended."'
III.

THE RULE

The rule to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims
must be extracted from the decisions perused above. On a
superficial level, the opinions fashioned a two-step inquiry
into: 1) whether the government's activities constituted a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
2) whether the search comported with constitutional requirements. However, at times this bifurcation breaks down;
the test employed in order to determine whether a search
had occurred has been used to evaluate whether the search
complied with constitutional criteria." 8 Nonetheless, this
delineation of the issues provides a good starting point to
begin the quest for the rule mandated by the Court.
115. Arkansas v. Sanders, supra note 104, at 2591.
116. Id.
117. Mr. Justice Burger's concurrence suggested that the Court's be read only
to hold that where police had probable cause and ample opportunity to
obtain a search warrant authorizing a search of a suitcase, the presence
of that suitcase in an automobile will not excuse their failure to seek
the warrant. Id. at 2594.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissent, argued that the result in this case will
spawn untold difficulties and confusion. In light of Carroll, supra note 36,
Chimel, supra note 40, and this decision, upon properly stopping a car
police would be faced with the impossible task of determining what permissibly could and could not be searched. Id. at 2595.
118. An example of this appeared in Arkansas v. Sanders, id at 2591, where
the Court's opinion noted that part of the justification for the 'car
exception' is a reduction of the reasonableness of an individual's expectation of privacy with respect to a car as opposed to other property.
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Determining Whether a Search Occurred

Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Rakas probably provides the most complete synopsis of the test to be
employed when determining whether a search has occurred
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Under the
test the essential elements of a search are a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a governmental intrusion upon
that expectation. But, "[t]he ultimate question is whether
one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances."" 9
Unfortunately, the Court has steadfastly refused to
identify the surrounding circumstances that need to be keyed
upon. On occasion though, it has in its opinions focused
upon one or more of the following factors: the precautions
taken in order to maintain one's privacy; the uses made
of the location in which the expectation of privacy was
vested; the likely intent of the drafters of the Constitution
as to the particular expectation of privacy involved; and the
property rights the claimant possessed in the invaded area.
But even here, the Court has equivocated; a factor crucial
in one decision will be ignored in another.1 "' Such an approach is analogous to a 'Rorschach blot;' a court looks at
the facts of a case, shouts either 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable,' and points to those facts which offer support for its
conclusion.'
There is one limitation on a court's freedom to conclude
that an expectation of privacy is reasonable; that is the
recurring theme in recent Court opinions that the exclusionary rule should be applied sparingly.2 This may even
119. Rakas v. Illinois, supra note 50, at 435.
120. In Katz much was made of the fact that the defendant had shut the door
to the public telephone booth behind him, see discusion by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist in Rakas v. Illinois, supra note 50, at 433. On the other hand,
in Smith v. Maryland, the Court's opinion refused to find that the fact the
defendant had placed the phone call from the phone in his own home of
U.S.
, 99 S.Ct. at 2582.
any significance, ........
121. In psychology, the principle behind the use of a Rorschach blot is that the
viewer when shown the blot will reveal the inner self, because the viewer
will see whatever he subconsciously wants to see. Presumably this is true
of the courts. See Amersterdam, supra note 9, at 375.
122. See supra note 67, and Note, The Evisceration of the Exclusionary
Rule: the Supreme Court Invents the Oral Evidence Exception, United
States v. Ceccolini, 485 U.S. 268 (1978), 15 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 323
(1980).
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be visible in the factors that the Court has looked to when
determining the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy
mentioned above.
When considering the use made of a location by the
individual claiming an expectation of privacy, the Court in
effect appears to be weighing whether the claimant's criminal activity is such that the Court would prefer not to have
the exclusionary rule invoked and run the risk that the
claimant would escape a conviction. Thus, by using property for criminal activity, an individual may destroy the
reasonableness of any expectation of privacy as to that
property. An intrusion by the goverment violating this expectation would, therefore, be outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment's proscriptions and the concomitant exclusionary
rule. Thus, any evidence obtained as123a result of the government's conduct would be admissible.
B.

Determining Whether the Search Meets Constitutional
Standards

Once a court determines that indeed a search occurred,
it must examine the search to see if it satisfied the Fourth
Amendment's criteria. For this, Mr. Justice Rehnquist concluded in Wolfish that all that is required is that the search
be reasonable. His test of reasonableness is a balancing of
the government's legitimate interests in the search against
the individual's interest in maintaining his privacy.
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Powell argued in Sanders
that the search must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant to a search warrant. By reasonable, he apparently
meant that there must have been some pre-existing justification for the search. However, he did recognize exceptions
to the search warrant requirement. These exceptions arise
when the government's interest in the search outweighs the
individual's interest in protecting his privacy.
123.

Of course this may defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterence
of police tactics that violate the spirit and meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the police will likely be encouraged to use questionable
tactics whenever they are convinced that they are dealing with a criminal,
because, if indeed they are, then the evidence obtained will more likely be
admissible.
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The real difference between these two approaches is
that Mr. Justice Powell requires the balancing test to be
done on a categorical basis, while Mr. Justice Rehnquist
apparently advocates a case by case balancing. Clearly, from
opinions,124 Mr. Justice Powell's analthe language of other
121
ysis is more correct.
CONCLUSION

When the Court abandoned the Olmstead analysis of
alleged Fourth Amendment violations, it was criticized for
its failure to adequately construct the new standard of review.
Even now, 12 years later, the same criticism can be leveled
at the Court, since the controlling standard is still rather
vague and uncertain. Of course, there are some indications
that this is the result of an attempt by the Court to allow
a mechanism whereby a court may avoid application of the
exclusionary rule. Unfortunately, this results in the curtailment of substantive Fourth Amendment rights in order to
limit the use of this remedy for the violation of those rights.
A better approach may be to firm up and possibly
broaden the substantive rights, while discussing separately
the appropriate remedy to administer when a violation of
the rights is found. A search within the meaning of the
Fourth should be found whenever government activities infringe upon an individual's privacy. Privacy should be defined as the right to be free from government intrusion, i.e.
the right to be left alone. 2 ' This right would arise whenever
a reasonable and prudent citizen would expect it in the same
or similar circumstances, or whenever the recognition of the
right would be necessary to protect and maintain our free,
open, and democratic society."2 7 Therefore, if a search is
found to have occurred, it would be per se unreasonable
unless it either satisfied the warrant requirement or fit one
of the "well-delineated" exceptions. Finally, the question of
99 S.Ct. 2249 (1979); in
U.S.
See Dunaway v. New York .........
particular see Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion, id. at 2260. Also, see
99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979).
Delaware v. Prouse, ........ U.S.
125. Wolfish may be viewed as establishing an exception for the category of
inmate searches.
126. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350.
127. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786-793 (1971) (Harlan. J.
dissenting).

124.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

23

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 9

298

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

the appropriate remedy for violation of an individual's right
could either be addressed by case-by-case balancing of the
desirability of invoking the exclusionary rule, or by an indepth re-examination by the Court of the continuing viability
of the exclusionary rule."'8
Nonetheless, the current state of the law concerning
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is a shambles. Moreover, it is likely that confusion will
continue to reign until such time as the Court is willing to
provide a more concrete analysis of unreasonable searches
and to face head-on its qualms concerning the exclusionary
rule.
MARTIN J. MCCLAIN

128.

I express no judgment on the wisdom of the exclusionary rule, as it is
outside the scope of this comment and is deserving of separate treatment.
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